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LEGAL AID SUFFICIENT 
UNLESS DETAINEE REQUESTS 
SPECIFIC COUNSEL 
R. v. Slinger, 2006 NLTD 14 
 
Police received an anonymous 
call that the driver of a truck 
had been drinking. A police 
officer located the vehicle with 
matching licence plate and saw it travel onto the 
yellow line a number of times and turn a corner 
without signalling. The truck was stopped and 
the accused had bloodshot eyes, an odour of 
alcohol, and failed a roadside test. He was read 
his Charter rights, the breathalyzer demand, and 
said he wanted to speak to a lawyer.  
 
At the police station the officer asked the 
accused if he knew any lawyers, but received a 
negative response. The accused did not ask for a 
phone book or express a desire to call any 
particular lawyer so the officer called legal aid. 
The accused spoke to legal aid in private for five 
minutes and did not request to speak to anyone 
else or express dissatisfaction with the advice 
he received. He subsequently provided two 
breath samples over the legal limit and was 
convicted of over 80 mg% in Newfoundland 
Provincial Court.  
 
The accused appealed to the Newfoundland 
Supreme Court arguing, in part, that his rights 
under s.10(b) of the Charter were violated. In 
his view the police were obligated to advise a 
detainee of the various options open to them if 
they indicated an interest in speaking to a 
lawyer. Justice Schwartz, however, disagreed 
stating: 
 
 
…I am satisfied that if a detained person 
requests specific counsel, or a phone book to 
call a particular lawyer, or seeks a lawyer 
specializing in a specific field such as criminal 
law, the police officer should accommodate 
that person and make all reasonable efforts to 
meet the request. However, when no such 
specific request is made a police officer has 
fulfilled his duty to a detained person 
pursuant to the Charter when he facilitates an 
arrangement for that person to speak to 
counsel through the Legal Aid toll free 
number. It is then incumbent upon the 
detained person to make a further request to 
speak to a specific lawyer or to convey he is 
not satisfied with the advice received and 
wishes to speak with someone else. 
……… 
Circumstances of each particular case must 
always be assessed. In this matter the facts 
indicate that after the [accused] was read his 
Charter Rights and Police Caution the police 
officer contacted the Legal Aid toll free line 
and made arrangements for [the accused] to 
speak to counsel by telephone. The [accused] 
did not refuse to speak to the lawyer 
contacted, did not indicate he wished to speak 
to any other particular lawyer, and after his 
conversation did not express a desire to obtain 
further advice from another lawyer. He also 
did not say he was dissatisfied with the 
information he had received. 
 
If [the accused] had expressed a desire to 
speak to someone else, either before or after 
the call was made to Legal Aid, and such a 
request was rejected, this could formulate a 
possible Charter breach. Such is not the case 
in this matter. [paras. 22-25] 
 
There was no Charter breach and the 
breathalyzer certificate was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
 “I'm a retired member…and 
am currently teaching new 
recruits criminal law and 
related topics…and have 
been for about two years 
now.  I have had occasion to read your 
newsletter several times as it was forwarded to 
me by other members of the service.  It is such 
a useful tool to try and keep current with some 
guiding cases.  I appreciate the way you 
summarize the information so the substance of 
the decision is quite apparent. At times I have 
used the cases as a case study exercise in my 
classes. I understand that your target audience 
is the operational police officers across British 
Columbia.  I was wondering if I could be added to 
your distribution list even though I'm an 
Albertan.”—Recruit Instructor, Alberta 
 ************ 
“I have been receiving this newsletter from a co-
worker over the last little while. It’s a good 
read”—Police Constable, RCMP British Columbia 
************ 
“Thanks for all your great work on such a useful 
product!!”—Special Investigations Unit 
************ 
“Always a pleasure reading the 10-8”—Police 
Sergeant, Manitoba 
************ 
“Great newsletter. Can you put me on the e-
mailing list?”—Police Officer, Manitoba 
************ 
“I find your publication extremely informative 
and practical for operational members. Thank 
you.”—Police Corporal, RCMP British Columbia 
************ 
“Thank you for the recent copies of 10-8. It is 
greatly appreciated in the office. I like your 
Legal Road test feature. An excellent 
newsletter…”—Crown Prosecutor, British 
Columbia 
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‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD      
TEST 
 
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge 
your understanding of the law. Each question is 
based on a case featured in this issue. See page 
19 for the answers. 
 
1. Implied licence allows the police to get from 
the sidewalk to a person’s doorstep for the 
purpose of communication without violating 
the person’s right to privacy. 
(a) true 
(b) false 
 
2. When searching for evidence as an incident to 
lawful arrest the police can search for 
evidence related to any offence. 
(a) true 
(b) false 
 
3. When the police enter a residence with a 
search warrant and arrest the occupants they 
are always entitled to hold off providing the 
arrestees access to a lawyer until the search 
is commenced.  
(a) true 
(b) false 
 
4. When assessing reasonable grounds for arrest 
during a police operation, the individual 
knowledge of the arresting officer is what 
counts rather than the collective knowledge 
of all the police officers involved in the 
operation. 
(a) true 
(b) false 
 
Note-able Quote 
Kind words can be short and easy to speak, but 
their echoes are truly endless—Mother Teresa 
                                                 
1 Senior officers 
2 Non-commissioned officers 
3 Constables 
FAST FACTS  
 
Police agencies policing a population of 100,000+ 
Locale Prov SOs1 NCOs2 Csts.3 Total 
Toronto ON 89 1,195 3,933 5,217 
Montreal QC 243 975 2,932 4,150 
Peel Reg. ON 44 287 1,292 1,623 
Calgary AB 33 338 1,140 1,511 
Edmonton AB 28 308 998 1,334 
Vancouver BC 40 174 1,071 1,285 
Winnipeg MB 23 275 908 1,206 
York Reg. ON 28 204 896 1,128 
Ottawa ON 29 241 848 1,118 
Durham Reg. ON 22 178 556 756 
Hamilton Reg. ON 17 169 555 741 
Quebec QC 57 159 478 694 
Niagara Reg. ON 16 137 520 673 
Waterloo Reg. ON 20 138 493 651 
Longueuil QC 45 118 392 555 
London ON 12 113 408 533 
Halton Reg. ON 14 88 418 520 
Laval QC 45 104 317 466 
Surrey (RCMP) BC 9 104 345 458 
Windsor ON 14 124 313 451 
Halifax Reg. NS 10 75 336 421 
Saskatoon SK 10 102 248 360 
Regina SK 10 122 206 338 
Gatineau QC 38 73 221 332 
St John’s NF 14 55 182 251 
Greater Sudbury ON 6 48 176 230 
Burnaby (RCMP) BC 4 54 156 214 
Thunder Bay ON 6 33 173 212 
Sherbrooke QC 9 27 164 200 
Richmond (RCMP) BC 3 42 153 198 
Abbotsford BC 7 37 143 187 
Saguenay QC 14 22 143 179 
Barrie ON 6 36 133 175 
Kingston ON 5 27 143 175 
Trois-Rivieres QC 22 14 137 173 
Cape Breton Reg. NS 5 28 137 170 
Guelph ON 7 30 130 167 
Chatham-Kent ON 8 25 131 164 
Saanich BC 6 29 109 144 
Delta BC 5 18 118 141 
Kelowna (RCMP) BC 3 30 105 138 
Codiac Reg. NB 2 27 108 137 
Levis QC 11 26 92 129 
Terrebonne QC 7 13 106 126 
Coquitlam (RCMP) BC 3 27 92 122 
Source: Police resources in Canada, 2005. Statistics Canada-
Catalogue no. 85-225 
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APPROACH TO HOME OK TO 
COMMUNICATE  
R. v. LeClaire, 2005 NSCA 165 
 
Police received an anonymous tip 
of a possible impaired driver. A 
man had been seen staggering to 
a truck and drive away. The 
licence number was provided and police attended 
the owner’s address, finding the truck parked in 
the driveway. The garage door was open and the 
officers could see a light in the door window 
that lead from the garage to the living area of 
the house. The officers went into the garage, 
saw a man inside the house, and knocked on the 
door. The accused opened the door and the 
officers told him they were investigating an 
impaired driving complaint and asked if they 
could come in. The accused was intoxicated, as 
evidenced by his physical condition, advised he 
could remain silent, and read his Charter rights. 
He admitted to drinking beer and then driving, 
that he had arrived home about 15 minutes 
earlier, and that he had drank some rum since.   
The officer read the breath demand and 
transported the accused to the police station, 
but he refused to provide a sample. 
 
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the judge 
found the garage entry unreasonable to the point 
where the accused allowed the officers inside 
his home, at which point it became lawful. The 
judge also ruled that the officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds to make the breath 
demand. The accused was convicted of refusing 
to provide a breath sample under s.254(5) of the 
Criminal Code, but then appealed to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge 
erred in holding that the unreasonable search 
was cured by the granting of permission to enter 
the house and that the officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds for the demand. 
 
The Knock at the Door 
 
Justice Roscoe, authoring the unanimous 
judgment for the appeal court, ruled that the 
entry into the garage to knock on the door was 
not an unreasonable search. The police were 
entitled to go through the garage and knock 
under the implied licence doctrine. He explained 
the doctrine as follows:  
 
There is an implied licence for all members of 
the public, including the police, to approach a 
door of a residence and knock… If the police 
act in accordance with this invitation, there is 
no intrusion upon the privacy of the occupant. 
The purpose of the approach to the door is 
determinative of whether they have operated 
within the implied invitation to knock. If the 
purpose of the police officer is to simply 
communicate with the occupant in a normal 
manner, proceeding from the street to "reach 
a point in relation to the house where he can 
conveniently" do so, is permitted within the 
implied licence [para. 13] 
 
And further: 
 
There is an implied invitation to the public to 
approach a door of a house to knock on it. If 
the police do not exceed the extent of the 
implied invitation, they do not intrude upon the 
privacy of the occupant. If the purpose is to 
simply communicate with the occupant, there is 
no breach of the privacy right. So for example, 
if the police approach the door with the intent 
of selling tickets for a charity event, there 
would likely be no encroachment upon privacy 
rights. [para. 27] 
 
As long as the motivation for the approach to 
the house is not to gather evidence (such as 
purposively taking a sniff), there is no s.8 
violation. Approaching to communicate or ask 
questions to further an investigation is 
permissible. The Court also noted that the 
approach extends to the point where a person 
can conveniently knock on the door, not a route 
elsewhere on the property to obtain evidence. In 
concluding that the police did not conduct an 
unreasonable search in this case, Justice Roscoe 
stated: 
 
In this case the police officers testified that 
there were no lights on upstairs and that it 
appeared that the path to the door of the 
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living quarters, where they could see a light, 
led through the garage. By proceeding through 
the open garage to knock on the door leading 
into the residence, they progressed "to the 
point where a person can conveniently knock on 
the door." By walking through the garage they 
were making a "direct approach" to the door 
apparently used by the occupants to enter the 
dwelling, not conducting a "trespassory detour" 
elsewhere on the property to secure evidence.  
 
[In other] cases where the suspects were 
followed into their garages by the police are 
entirely distinguishable from the facts in this 
case. Since [they] were personally present in 
their garages with the doors open, the police 
did not stop to knock. The police in those cases 
just walked right in without asking any 
permission. Therefore the drivers had no 
opportunity to choose not to answer the knock 
on the door or to refuse to be observed or 
engaged in conversation. Unlike in the present 
case, the police in those cases were able, by 
entering into the garages, to obtain relevant 
evidence about the condition of the drivers 
without first asking permission to enter. 
Another difference is that in both of those 
cases the suspects objected to the presence 
of the police in their garages. There was 
obviously no implied invitation to enter or an 
explicit invitation like the one extended by 
[the accused] in response to the knock. Any 
implied invitation to enter the garage in [the 
other cases] was clearly and expressly 
retracted. 
 
Conversely, the entry into [the accused’s] 
garage was innocuous. The open garage was like 
an extension of the driveway, forming part of 
the approach to the door. No evidence was 
secured by walking through the garage to 
knock on the door.  
 
I therefore conclude that in the 
circumstances of this case, the conduct of the 
police did not amount to a search within the 
meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, because their 
purpose when they went onto the property of 
the [accused] was to investigate the 
commission of an offence, not to specifically 
gather evidence to use against the [accused]. 
Furthermore, on these facts, the entry 
through the garage in order to access a door 
on which to knock did not exceed the authority 
implied by the invitation to knock and 
therefore did not infringe on the [accused’s] 
reasonable expectation of privacy. I would 
dismiss this ground of appeal. 
 
Although I would dismiss this ground of appeal, 
I emphasize that it is for different reasons 
than those given by the trial judge. I do not 
agree that if the walk through the garage had 
been properly categorized as an unlawful 
search, the actions of [the accused] in 
permitting the officers to come into his home 
should be considered to be a waiver of his 
right to privacy. I would respectfully disagree 
with the conclusion that the evidence supports 
a finding that the consent to enter the home 
was both voluntary and informed as required 
by the case law on waivers…[references 
omitted, paras. 31-35] 
 
Reasonable and Probable Grounds 
 
While his intoxication was apparent to the 
officer at the home, the accused submitted the 
officer did not have reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe he was impaired when he 
drove his vehicle earlier. He argued the 
information about his staggering was third hand 
hearsay and the police were not experts in the 
effects of alcohol on the body, including rates of 
absorption and elimination.  
 
Reasonable and probable grounds require a 
subjective and an objective analysis. The 
subjective branch relates to the officers 
honestly held belief while the grounds must also 
have an objective foundation. In this case there 
were ample grounds; the anonymous tip, an 
admission to drinking then driving, a strong smell 
of alcohol, unsteadiness, glossy eyes, and slurred 
speech. “The fact that part of the bundle of 
information available to the officers was hearsay 
arising from an anonymous tip is not material”, 
said Justice Roscoe.   
 
The argument that there were not sufficient 
grounds to believe the accused was impaired 
when he was driving, but may have become 
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impaired since drinking at home, was also 
rejected: 
 
[The trial judge] accepted that the officer 
was entitled to rely on his own opinion of [the 
accused’s] sobriety at the time of talking with 
him as a basis for believing that he was 
impaired at the time of driving. Although the 
officer's opinion would not be sufficient 
evidence upon which to base a conviction for 
impaired driving, I agree with the trial judge 
that the officer is able to rely on his own 
judgment and past experience when 
determining whether he has reasonable and 
probable grounds. …[T]he officer is entitled to 
make certain assumptions based on his 
observations of the suspect. Although [the 
accused] told the officers that he had been 
drinking since arriving home, the officers were 
entitled to evaluate the validity of that 
statement in the context of the other 
evidence relating to the glasses. [para. 44] 
 
And further: 
 
I am not satisfied that the trial judge in this 
case committed any error in concluding that 
the officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds to make the demand for a breath 
sample. The information giving rise to the 
reasonable and probable grounds included the 
admission by [the accused] that he had been 
driving a few minutes before, that he had a 
few beers before he drove, that he was very 
likely the person seen by the informant to be 
staggering, and the numerous physical indicia 
of impairment, including slurred speech, 
unsteadiness, glossy eyes, and a strong smell 
of alcohol. These factors, coupled with the 
officer's understanding that it takes time to 
get that drunk, established reasonable and 
probable grounds that [the accused] was 
impaired at the time of driving. [para. 47] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Education is learning what you didn’t even know 
you didn’t know—Daniel J. Boorstin 
HOTEL DESK DRAWER A ‘PLACE’ 
FOR BREAK-IN PURPOSES 
R. v. Charron, 2005 BCCA 607 
 
The accused was observed by a 
hotel operator on video 
surveillance looking into a 
hotel’s pantry through a keyhole 
and then enter a concierge area by stepping over 
a latched gate. The operator called security and 
the accused was confronted about 10 feet from 
the concierge’s desk. He said he was visiting a 
friend but there was no-one by the name he 
provided registered at the hotel.  When told this 
information, the accused said he made a mistake 
and his friend was actually staying at another 
hotel nearby. After the security guard 
attempted to verify the accused’s story, they 
returned to the hotel where the accused 
emptied his pockets on request, producing a 
broken cutlery knife embossed with the hotel’s 
initial, as well as some pills which he quickly 
swallowed. Fresh damage to the desk drawers in 
the concierge area was also discovered. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of the Criminal Code 
offences of break and enter and commit an 
indictable offence (theft) as well as possession 
of break-in instruments (a prying knife). The 
trial judge concluded the concierge area was a 
“place” as defined in s.348(1)(b) of the Criminal 
Code. However, the judge did not make a specific 
finding of theft.  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal. Although the Crown conceded 
there was insufficient evidence to support a 
theft, Justice Low, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, quashed the conviction for break and 
enter and commit an indictable offence (theft) 
and substituted a conviction for break and enter 
with intent to commit an indictable offence. As 
for the possession of break-in instruments 
conviction the accused challenged whether the 
desk or drawers in the concierge area was a 
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“place” as defined in the Criminal Code and also 
whether the broken knife was suitable for 
break-ins. In upholding the trial judge’s decision 
on these issues, Justice Low stated: 
 
…the trial judge had already said that the 
[accused] was “in a building or structure or any 
part thereof”.  This is in accord with the 
definition of place in s. 348(3)(b) of the Code.  
Both the desk and the drawers in it were a 
“place”.  
 
As to the suitability of the knife as a break-in 
instrument, that is a matter of common 
knowledge…It is common experience that a 
knife could be used to force a gate latch or a 
drawer lock. 
 
The explanations given by the [accused], even 
if believable, merely suggest one or another 
reason for him being in the hotel.  They do not 
explain his presence in a closed-off area. 
[references omitted, paras. 12-14] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
APPROVED SCREENING 
DEVICES vs. APPROVED 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
Under s.254 of the Criminal 
Code a peace officer can give 
two types of breath test 
demands. An approved 
screening device demand can 
be made under s.254(2) if a 
peace officer reasonably suspects a person 
operating or in care and control of a motor 
vehicle has alcohol in their body. An approved 
screening device is defined as “a device of a kind 
that is designed to ascertain the presence of 
alcohol in the blood of a person and that is 
approved for the purposes of this section by 
order of the Attorney General of Canada.” 
 
Under the Criminal Code Regulations—Approved 
Screening Devices Order—the following devices, 
are approved for the purposes of section 254 of 
the Criminal Code: 
 
(a) Alcolmeter S-L2; 
(b) Alco-Sûr; 
(c) Alcotest®7410 PA3; 
(d) Alcotest® 7410 GLC; 
(e) Alco-Sensor IV DWF; 
(f) Alco-Sensor IV PWF; and 
(g) Intoxilyzer 400D.  
 
An approved instrument 
demand (aka. breathalyzer 
demand”) can be made 
under s.254(3) if a peace 
officer has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe 
a person has committed, by 
consuming alcohol, the offence of impaired 
driving/care or control or over 80mg%. An 
approved instrument is defined as “an instrument 
of a kind that is designed to receive and make an 
analysis of a sample of the breath of a person in 
order to measure the concentration of alcohol in 
the blood of that person and is approved as 
suitable for the purposes of section 258 by 
order of the Attorney General of Canada.”  
 
Under the Criminal Code Regulations— Approved 
Breath Analysis Instruments Order—the 
following instruments are approved as suitable 
for the purposes of section 258 of the Criminal 
Code: 
 
(a) Breathalyzer ®, Model 800; 
(b) Breathalyzer ®, Model 900; 
(c) Breathalyzer ®, Model 900A; 
(d) Intoximeter Mark IV; 
(e) Alcolmeter AE-D1; 
(f) Intoxilyzer 4011AS; 
(g) Alcotest® 7110; 
(h) Intoxilyzer ® 5000 C; 
(i) Breathalyzer®, Model 900B; 
(j) Intoxilyzer 1400; 
(k) BAC Datamaster C; 
(l) Alco-Sensor IV-RBT IV; 
(m) Breathalyzer® 7410-CDN with Printer; 
(n) Alco-Sensor IV/RBT IV-K; and 
(o) Alcotest 7110 MKIII Dual C.  
 8            www.10-8.ca Volume 6 Issue 2 
  March/April 2006 
SUSPENSION OF RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL TOO LONG 
R. v. Patterson, 2006 BCCA 24 
 
After stopping a black Cadillac 
at about 1:00 pm, the police 
officer saw the male driver and 
female passenger quickly 
change seats. The officer had been present 
when the accused was served a driving 
prohibition a month earlier and had known him to 
be aggressive. He complied with an order to exit 
the vehicle, was arrested for driving while 
prohibited under British Columbia’s Motor 
Vehicle Act, and patted down. A baggie 
containing 13.8 grms. of cocaine was found in his 
pants pocket. He was then arrested for 
possession for the purpose of trafficking and a 
search of the vehicle resulted in the seizure of 
an expandable baton in the centre of the 
console. The accused, along with two passengers, 
was arrested for possession of a prohibited 
weapon and given his Charter rights and 
warnings.  He requested to speak to a lawyer and 
was transported to police cells, arriving at 1:24 
pm.  
 
The accused was not allowed to call his lawyer 
because the officer wanted to search his 
residence. He was concerned for officer safety 
and the destruction of evidence if the arrestees 
called someone before the search was 
completed. A warrant was obtained at 5:01 pm 
and the search began at 5:50 pm, ending at 7:16 
pm. Drug paraphernalia, cash, and weapons were 
seized. The accused was offered the use of a 
telephone at 7:30 pm.  
 
At trial the judge concluded that the officer 
had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest 
the accused without a warrant under s.79 of the 
Motor Vehicle Act for prohibited driving. The 
cocaine was found during a non-intrusive pat 
down search and an arrest for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking followed. The judge also 
ruled that the accused’s right to counsel had not 
been violated until the search warrant was 
executed. In her view the police were entitled to 
get the premises under control given the 
officer’s concern about safety and evidence 
preservation. However, once the search was 
commenced at 5:50 pm the accused should have 
been allowed access to counsel. The cocaine was 
nonetheless admitted as evidence under s.24(2) 
of the Charter and the accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking under s.5(2) of the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act.  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial 
judge erred in not finding a s.8 Charter violation 
regarding the search incidental to arrest and 
that his rights under s.10(b) were also breached 
when he was held “incommunicado” and denied 
access to a lawyer from the time he was 
arrested until the search was completed on his 
residence.  
 
The Arrest and Search 
 
Justice Levine, authoring the unanimous appeal 
court judgment agreed with the trial judge that 
the officer had “obvious” grounds for arrest; he 
was involved with the service of the accused’s 
driving prohibition a month prior, he saw him 
driving a vehicle he was known to drive, he saw 
him move from the driver’s seat to the 
passenger seat, knew he was aggressive and had 
reasonable grounds to be concerned for his 
safety. Justice Levine stated: 
 
I agree with the trial judge…that it was not 
reasonably necessary for the police officer to 
check his computer to confirm that the driving 
prohibition was still in effect, nor was it 
necessary in the circumstances for him to ask 
whether the prohibition had been appealed and 
stayed. 
 
There is no basis to find, as the [accused] 
alleges, that the police officer breached s. 
29(2) of the Criminal Code by failing to advise 
the [accused] that he was being arrested for 
driving while prohibited. The [accused’s] 
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conduct in changing seats made it clear that 
he knew why he was stopped…and the officer 
was not required to state the grounds for the 
arrest before he searched the [accused]. 
 
Nor is there any basis to find that [the 
officer] acted in bad faith. The [accused] 
suggests that [the officer] was “rounding up” 
the [accused] and the two passengers in the 
car for suspected drug violations. Much of the 
[accused’s] argument regarding bad faith 
focused on the treatment of the two 
passengers, which is of course not relevant to 
the [accused’s] claim that his Charter rights 
were breached… The trial judge made no 
finding with regard to bad faith. In any event, 
there is no basis for the claim, since the trial 
judge clearly found, and I agree, that [the 
officer] had reasonable grounds for the arrest 
and he believed that he had such grounds. 
[references omitted, paras. 20-22] 
 
Since the arrest was properly based on 
reasonable grounds, the incidental search that 
followed was reasonable and did not contravene 
s.8.  
 
Denial of Telephone Access  
 
The accused argued that his rights under s.10(b) 
were violated because he was denied access to 
counsel until the search of his home was 
completed. He submitted that the evidence 
should be excluded under s.24(2) or a stay of 
proceedings should be granted under s.24(1). The 
Crown conceded his rights were violated when 
police denied access to a telephone after the 
search commenced, but contended there was no 
breach from arrest to the start of the search. 
 
Justice Levine ruled that the trial judge erred in 
finding the police were justified in holding off on 
the accused’s access to counsel until the search 
had commenced. The officer’s concerns about 
safety and evidence were too general and not 
specific. After considering other case law, 
Justice Lavine noted: 
 
[The cases of] Strachan, Schultz, James, and 
Kiloh share certain characteristics not present 
in this case. All of them dealt with 
investigations in progress, involving high risk, 
volatile situations where firearms were known 
to be involved. The police had identifiable 
reasons for concerns about the potential for 
violence and a risk that evidence may 
disappear or be destroyed. In Strachan, the 
police encountered not only the accused, but 
two other unknown persons, during a search 
for known firearms. In Schultz, the accused 
was involved, with accomplices, in a violent 
armed kidnapping. In James, the accused and 
accomplices were involved in the violent 
murder of a security guard, and were known to 
be trading in firearms. In Kiloh, the accused 
were arrested in a volatile situation for armed 
robberies of jewellery stores where shots had 
been fired at civilians. 
 
In this case, the trial judge accepted that 
[the officer] had concerns about officer 
safety and the preservation of evidence. But 
the concerns were of a general nature; there 
was no evidence that the police knew there 
were weapons in the residence, or that the 
[accused] had accomplices in his drug dealings 
that were at large or in the residence. There 
was no investigation in progress until after the 
[accused’s] arrest, which arose initially from a 
roadside stop for a driving prohibition.  It 
took an unexplained three-and-a-half hours to 
obtain the search warrant, and another fifty 
minutes until the search of his home began. 
The “suspension” of the [accused’s] right to 
counsel extended over a total of six-and-a-
half hours.  
 
In my opinion, the [accused’s] right under s. 
10(b) of the Charter to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay was infringed when he 
was not allowed to use a telephone shortly 
after he was taken to the police detachment 
and charged. The police were not justified in 
“suspending” the [accused’s] right for six-and-
a-half hours. [paras. 40-42] 
 
Despite this Charter breach, the evidence was 
admissible under s.24(2) and a stay of 
proceedings under s.24(1) was not justified. The 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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REASONABLE GROUNDS BASED 
ON INDIVIDUAL BELIEF, NOT 
COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE 
Richardson v. Vancouver, 2006 BCCA 36 
 
The police organized a cleanup 
operation after homeless people 
were evicted from a large 
vacant building and some of the 
squatters, and their supporters, camped out on 
the sidewalk under the building’s canopy. The 
plaintiff, a lawyer and executive director of the 
Pivot Legal Society, attempted to cross a police 
line set up to keep the peace and protect city 
workers removing tents, mattresses, and debris. 
The plaintiff was yelling, identified himself as a 
lawyer, and demanded to know the police 
authority for cordoning off the area.  
 
He tried to get through the police line, but was 
told he could not cross. He continued to move 
through the line, so a police officer took him by 
the arm and moved him to the sidewalk, telling 
him if he tried again he would be arrested for 
obstructing a peace officer. He tried again and 
was arrested. He was handcuffed, searched, 
placed in a wagon, and transported to jail where 
he was held overnight and released without 
charge.  
 
The plaintiff sued the City of Vancouver in 
British Columbia Provincial Court alleging, among 
other torts, that he was subject to a wrongful 
arrest. The trial judge ruled that the officer 
had reasonable grounds to arrest the plaintiff 
for obstructing the officer in the lawful 
execution of his duty. In the judge’s opinion, the 
officer’s perception of the events, when viewed 
objectively, would have been apparent to a 
reasonable person placed in the officer’s 
position. The plaintiff had crossed a police 
cordon set up to keep the peace and protect city 
workers. He had been removed once and warned 
to stay behind the police line. His lawsuit was 
dismissed. 
 
The plaintiff appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial 
judge erred in finding the arrest lawful. He 
submitted that the trial judge only considered 
what the arresting officer saw or heard, and 
ignored what other police members were aware 
of. Since other officers at the scene knew he 
was a lawyer who represented protestors, that 
he requested to speak to the officer in charge, 
and that he demanded to know why the police 
barred access to the street, he suggested his 
arrest for obstruction was untenable. Justice 
Donald writing the opinion of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. In 
his view the question was not whether the 
collective knowledge of the officers on scene 
provided the necessary grounds, but rather what 
was apparent to the arresting officer at the 
scene. Nor did it matter whether or not the 
plaintiff could have been convicted of the 
charge. Justice Donald stated: 
 
The lawfulness of arrest must depend on the 
subjective belief of the arresting officer and 
an objective assessment of that belief based 
on what the officer knew at the material 
time.  It is a question related to the individual 
officer.  I know of no authority that supports 
the notion of a collective intelligence, the sum 
of knowledge possessed by all the police in an 
operation, as the basis for judging the 
lawfulness of arrest.  Here, [the arresting 
officer] arrived on the scene in the middle of 
the action and had no opportunity to learn 
what prior interaction the plaintiff had had 
with other officers.  It cannot be said that he 
was indifferent or wilfully blind to relevant 
circumstances.  
 
The premise of the plaintiff's line of argument 
is that he was not guilty of obstructing the 
police and he therefore could not have been 
lawfully arrested.  This is a theme running 
through the wrongful arrest claim and I think, 
with respect, it is wrong. 
 
The plaintiff runs together his criminal 
liability with the officer's civil liability (and 
the City's vicarious liability) for the tort of 
wrongful arrest.  They each have a different 
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set of legal rules and procedures; they must 
be treated separately to avoid the kind of 
confused thinking manifest in the plaintiff's 
argument.  Many lawful arrests may ultimately 
result in an acquittal.  If an acquittal were to 
create exposure to tort liability, the power of 
arrest would be radically curtailed.  There is 
no logical relationship between the criminal 
and civil determinations; they are each aimed 
at different questions:  "Did the accused 
obstruct?" is not the same as "Did the officer 
have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe he did?" [paras. 18-20]. 
 
The appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
CDSA SEARCH WARRANT 
PROVISION CONSTITUTIONAL 
R. v. Barnhill & Barnhill, 2006 BCSC 42 
 
Police executed a s.11 
Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) search 
warrant on the accused’s 
residence and outbuildings for a marihuana grow 
operation at 11:35 pm. The accused and his two 
teenage daughters were sleeping when police 
entered the house. He was charged with 
marihuana production and possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, but applied in British 
Columbia Supreme Court to have s.11 of the 
CDSA declared unconstitutional because it 
violated s.8 of the Charter since it did not place 
any time restrictions on when a residence could 
be searched.  
 
Section 11 of the CDSA allows a justice, when 
satisfied there are reasonable grounds, to issue 
a search warrant authorizing a peace officer to 
search “at any time”. Unlike s.488 of the Criminal 
Code, which requires a justice to endorse a night 
time search (9 pm-6 am) under s.487 or a 
telewarrant under s.487.1, s.11 of the CDSA does 
not.  Because there is no such limitation in s.11, 
the accused argued that a night time search 
conducted under s.11 was unreasonable and 
violated s.8 of the Charter.  
 
Justice Joyce ruled that the absence of such a 
night time search limitation did not render s.11 
unconstitutional.  He stated: 
 
In my view the manufacture and trade in 
controlled substances creates special 
challenges for the police and requires special 
measures to deal with it.  Manufacturing 
facilities for marihuana and other controlled 
substances, such as methamphetamine and 
ecstasy, are generally not found in industrial 
areas.  Nor are they usually set up with safety 
in mind.  They are commonly found in the 
basements and kitchens of ordinary homes and 
apartments in residential areas.  They 
frequently involve dangerous electrical wiring.  
Toxic and dangerous chemicals are used in the 
manufacture of many of these drugs.  The 
operations expose not only those who operate 
them to the risk of harm from fire, explosion 
and exposure to toxic chemicals but also 
unknowing neighbours and sometimes the 
innocent children and other family members of 
the operators.  Weapons are often found at 
such operations or in the hands of those 
persons responsible for them.  It is important, 
therefore, that when there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that a drug manufacturing 
operation exists in any place, including a 
residence, the police be able to act quickly to 
conduct a search, apprehend the operators 
and dismantle the operation.  
 
A number of decisions have emphasized the 
harm caused by illicit drug manufacture and 
trade and the difficulties faced by the 
authorities in combating it. They note that 
Parliament has adopted special provisions to 
deal with the problem… 
 
In my view s. 11(1) of the CDSA strikes an 
appropriate balance between the need to 
safeguard the rights of citizens against 
unwanted and unwarranted intrusions into 
their home and the interests of the state in 
the demands and challenges of law 
enforcement… 
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It should be noted as well that there is 
nothing in s. 11(1) of the CDSA that purports 
to take away the residual discretion of the 
justice to refuse to issue a search warrant in 
appropriate circumstances even though the 
statutory criteria for its issuance have been 
met, that is required by s. 8 of the Charter… 
 
I therefore conclude that s. 11 of the CDSA 
does not contravene s. 8 of the Charter by 
reason of the fact that it permits a justice to 
issue a search warrant authorizing a peace 
office, at any time, to search the place 
specified for the things enumerated in that 
subsection. [references omitted, paras. 31-35] 
 
The accused’s application was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
‘URGENT & HEIGHTENED 
CIRCUMSTANCES’ JUSTIFY 
DETENTION 
R. v. Mollazadeh, 2006 BCCA 35 
 
A police officer received a 
priority one call of a shooting at 
a nightclub. He took up a 
containment position and heard 
on the police radio that a 911 
caller reported persons involved were leaving the 
area in a black four door vehicle travelling 
through an intersection passing a police vehicle. 
At that moment the officer saw a black four 
door Jetta pass him. The Jetta was accelerating 
and passing other vehicles.  
 
The officer followed the vehicle and once back-
up arrived stopped it. The accused (driver) and 
his passenger were ordered out of the vehicle. 
They and the vehicle were then searched for 
weapons. In the car police found crack cocaine. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused argued that the police ignored other 
information available (the suspected shooter was 
a black male, a Corvette was of interest, six 
males ran into a dark four-door sedan) and 
therefore did not have articulable cause to 
detain him. The trial judge, however, found the 
detention justified, stating:  
 
The accused argues that the police ignored 
information that, if considered, would have 
alerted them to the possibility that the Jetta 
was not reasonably involved in the shooting. 
That information included the police radio 
broadcast concerning a black Corvette, six 
male occupants in a four-door sedan, and a 
black male suspect in a red t-shirt 
 
However, [the officer] could not recall 
hearing that information. He testified that, 
once he saw the dark four-door sedan pass 
him on Hornby Street and heard that the 
suspect vehicle was travelling north on 
Hornby and was passing a police vehicle at 
that location, he was then focussed on the 
task of following that vehicle. 
 
The police were responding to a high priority 
call, which calls for immediate response. They 
had a duty to check all leads. They did not 
have the luxury of waiting and synthesizing all 
the information available to them. 
 
When the police pulled over the Jetta, they 
knew that a shooting had recently occurred at 
the Urban Well. They had a description of a 
dark four-door sedan. They were told it was 
travelling north on Hornby Street. The sedan 
was reported to be passing a police vehicle at 
the very location Constable Barry was posted 
in his police wagon. There was a reasonable 
concern that the persons fleeing the scene of 
a shooting would have firearms in their 
possession 
 
In my respectful view, that information 
constitutes, in the urgent and heightened 
circumstances of this case, a combination of 
objectively discernible facts that justified 
the police detaining the occupants of the 
Jetta.  
 
The accused was convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking but appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing he was arbitrarily 
detained and the drugs should not have been 
admitted as evidence. Justice Ryan, delivering 
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the opinion for the Court, disagreed. In her view, 
the trial judge did not err in her analysis. The 
appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
YOUTH SENTENCING ONUS 
UPHELD 
R. v. K.D.T., 2006 BCCA 60 
 
The accused, a young person 
under the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act (YCJA), was 
convicted of manslaughter in 
British Columbia Supreme 
Court. Since manslaughter is a “presumptive 
offence” under s.2 of the YCJA, an adult 
sentence is required unless the youth applies for 
a youth sentence and satisfies the court that a 
youth sentence is appropriate in the 
circumstances. The accused applied to be 
sentenced as a youth, but Crown opposed the 
application.  
 
The sentencing judge then ruled that the 
accused’s rights under s.7 of the Charter (the 
right to life, liberty, and security of the person) 
were breached because he bore the onus of 
persuading the court that he should not be 
sentenced as an adult. The judge ordered that 
Crown now needed to prove the accused should 
get an adult sentence. She sentenced the 
accused as a youth and gave him a sentence of 
20 months in custody followed by 12 months 
supervision and a 10 year firearms ban and 
ordered a DNA sample. The Crown appealed the 
judge’s ruling on the constitutionality of the 
sentencing provision under the YCJA as well as 
the sentence given.  
 
Under the old Young Offenders Act (YOA) a 
youth charged with a serious crime could be 
raised to adult court. Today, however, there is a 
presumptive offence regime found in s.72 of the 
YCJA. If a youth 14 years or older is convicted 
of a presumptive offence (such as manslaughter), 
they are to be sentenced as an adult, unless the 
accused applies for an order that they be 
sentenced as a youth. If the Crown opposes the 
youth’s application a hearing will be held to 
determine the appropriateness of a youth 
sentence. The YCJA presumptively places the 
onus on the youth to justify a youth sentence 
rather than on the Crown to justify an adult 
sentence.   
 
Justice Braidwood, authoring the unanimous 
British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, ruled 
that s.72 did not violate s.7 of the Charter. 
After reviewing several cases and considering 
the transfer provisions under the former Young 
Offenders Act, he stated: 
 
The onus described in…s. 72(2) of the YCJA is 
not one that contains a requirement of proof, 
nor does it remove the onus on the party 
bringing forward contested facts to prove 
those facts.  As in any sentencing situation, if 
the Crown wishes to bring forward evidence of 
aggravating factors, the Crown bears the 
burden of proving any relevant facts that are 
contested. Likewise, contested facts in 
support of mitigating factors must be proved 
by the offender.  As in all sentencing 
situations, the aim of the judge is to balance 
the considerations raised and arrive at an 
appropriate sentence. 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that s. 
72(2) of the YCJA does not mark the debut of 
a presumptive offence regime or a reverse 
onus in the Canadian youth criminal justice 
system.  The post-1995 YOA contained a 
presumptive offence scheme as well:  a young 
person charged with a presumptive offence 
had to apply to be tried in youth court, as 
opposed to the general court system, and 
satisfy the court that the change of forum 
was appropriate in the circumstances.  Courts 
in several jurisdictions, including British 
Columbia, held that there was no constitutional 
breach created by the onus provision set out 
in the 1995 version of the YOA… 
……… 
 
…"Once guilt has been established, our 
fundamental principles of justice dictate a 
focus on the most appropriate sentence for 
the guilty party."  By establishing the 
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presumptive offence regime under the YCJA, 
Parliament has said that the appropriate 
sentences for serious violent crimes are adult 
sentences.  By providing the convicted youth 
the opportunity to satisfy the court that an 
adult sentence is not appropriate in his or her 
circumstances, Parliament allowed an 
appropriate sentence to be crafted that takes 
both the vulnerability of young persons and 
the purposes of the YCJA into account. 
 
In summation, the onus on the applicant under 
s. 72(2) of the YCJA…does not place an 
onerous burden of proof on the convicted 
youth.  While it is true that the framework in 
the YCJA is, in some respects, different from 
that in the YOA, it is not sufficiently distinct 
to indicate that there is a different onus 
being placed on the convicted youth under s. 
72(2) than the onus on the accused youth at a 
transfer hearing.  If the onus was 
constitutionally acceptable at the pre-trial 
stage, where s. 7 rights play a more significant 
role, then it is also constitutional at the 
sentencing stage.  I find that s. 72(2) of the 
YCJA is not contrary to s. 7 of the Charter. 
 It is not necessary therefore to address 
whether the provision is justified under s. 1. 
[references omitted, paras. 62-68] 
 
And further he went on to conclude: 
 
The onus provision in s. 72(2) of the YCJA 
does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.  The onus 
on the convicted youth to demonstrate that he 
or she should be sentenced as a youth is a 
legislative choice that forms part of the 
balancing of considerations that occurs in the 
sentencing procedure.  It is not a heavy 
burden, but is consistent with the standard 
described by the Supreme Court of Canada…  
Further, it is not an onus that applies with 
regard to issues of guilt or innocence, nor are 
concerns about a fair trial raised when dealing 
with the sentencing process. 
 
In the context of the YCJA, I am not 
persuaded that a young person would face an 
unreasonable burden in a sentencing hearing 
under s. 72.  When the tests in s. 72 are 
properly applied, the persons who will receive 
an adult sentence for a presumptive offence 
are those for whom a youth sentence would 
not provide accountability. [paras. 82-83] 
 
As for the sentence, an adult sentence was 
appropriate. Justice Braidwood found a sentence 
of 2 years less a day with 2 years probation fit.  
The 10 year firearms ban and DNA sample 
remained in effect. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
AMBULANCE ATTENDANTS 
NOT ‘CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERVENORS’ 
R. v. Brissonnet, 2006 ONCJ 31 
 
Two ambulance attendants 
driving in a marked ambulance 
followed the accused driving 
erratically over three blocks. 
The ambulance driver, concerned there might be 
an accident, used emergency lights and siren to 
get the accused’s attention while the other 
attendant waved him over. After a brief 
conversation, an attendant was satisfied there 
was nothing medically wrong and asked the 
accused for his car keys, which were 
surrendered. The police were called, arrived 15 
minutes later, and arrested the accused for 
impaired operation. He was advised of his rights 
to counsel and read the breath demand, later 
providing samples of 173 mg% and 161 mg%. 
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused applied to have the evidence gathered 
by the ambulance attendants excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter because they did not 
advise him of his s.10(b) rights. Furthermore, 
without their evidence, the accused argued the 
officer did not have reasonable grounds for the 
breath demand, thereby violating his right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure. 
In his view, the breathalyzer readings should 
also be excluded.  
 
Although the ambulance attendants were 
employees of a municipal government and acted 
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under their statutory powers under the Highway 
Traffic Act in order to stop the accused, they 
were not “constitutional intervenors” when they 
took his keys and detained him until police 
arrived. In ruling that it was not necessary for 
the ambulance attendants to provide the accused 
with his rights under s.10(b) of the Charter, 
Justice Harris stated; 
 
…the real question to be asked is whether the 
individual initiating the detention is a 
"constitutional intervenor" for the purposes 
of the Charter (rather than a State agent - 
an expression now devoid of all meaning).  
 
Extrapolating from existing case law on 
detention, it is submitted that the "detainor" 
is a constitutional intervenor and responsible 
for the provision of s. 10 rights if the 
individual satisfies one of the following two 
criteria: 
 
(a) The detainor initiated contact with the 
accused at the request or direction of 
the police, pursuant to an express 
delegation of police powers… 
Or, 
 
(b) The detainor initiated contact with the 
accused specifically and primarily for 
the purpose of conducting a criminal 
investigation within the terms of his/her 
employment and there has been at least 
partial abandonment of a police power to 
the private sector… 
 
In this case, the contact with [the accused] 
was primarily for the purpose of public safety 
- protecting other drivers from a head-on 
collision. That the ambulance attendants 
might ascertain that the cause of the erratic 
driving was due to alcohol impairment or some 
other medical explanation, was incidental to 
the purposes of the stop: They certainly were 
not conducting a criminal investigation. As 
well, their actions were entirely outside the 
normal terms of their employment. While they 
may have used the emergency equipment on 
the vehicle improperly and in a manner 
unintended by the enabling legislation, their 
actions can be justified as a minor provincial 
violation in pursuit of the preservation of 
human life, not unlike a police vehicle passing 
through a red light in pursuit of a dangerous 
driver. In other words, the ambulance 
attendants were acting in a civilian capacity 
notwithstanding the fact that they were 
employed by the (municipal) government and 
they briefly used, in a very minimal fashion, a 
statutory power they possessed to bring the 
defendant's vehicle to a standstill. The two 
criteria listed above would place the 
ambulance attendants outside of the 
application of the Charter and as well, would 
have the virtue of permitting government 
employees to intervene in their civilian 
capacity to preserve life and property from 
the tragic results of drinking and driving 
without the judicialization of 
government/civilian relations beyond the point 
that society could tolerate. 
 
Further, the ambulance attendants in their 
civilian capacity do not meet the definition of 
constitutional intervenors because they were 
neither acting under the direction of the 
police nor conducting a criminal investigation 
within the terms of their employment. They 
were merely civilians acting to protect the 
public from another civilian… 
 
Consequently, in all the circumstances, I find 
that the ambulance attendants were not 
constitutional intervenors and were not 
responsible for, or expected to, provide the 
defendant with his rights under s. 10 of the 
Charter. If I am wrong in the conclusion such 
that there was a breach of s. 10(b), I would 
conclude that the breach was of such a minor 
nature that to exclude the evidence 
requested would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. The attendants were 
acting in good faith as responsible, concerned 
citizens to protect the public from what was 
becoming a very dangerous situation. They 
should be encouraged to do so. Their 
intervention was as minimally intrusive as was 
required to remove the danger. Finally, the 
evidence (the observations of the attendants) 
was non-conscriptive and did not affect trial 
fairness; the charges were serious and the 
defendant had little expectation of privacy as 
to his manner of driving. Having ruled against 
the alleged s. 10(b) violation and application to 
 16            www.10-8.ca Volume 6 Issue 2 
  March/April 2006 
exclude evidence, it will not be necessary to 
consider the Charter s. 8 argument. 
[references omitted, paras. 19-23] 
 
The breathalyzer readings, however, were 
excluded on other grounds.  
 
POLICY BASED ERT ENTRY 
UNREASONABLE  
R. v. Bui & Nguyen, 2006 BCPC 47 
 
After obtaining a search 
warrant for a marihuana grow 
operation at a residence, police 
used an Emergency Response 
Team (ERT) to serve the 
warrant. An officer used a bullhorn to make four 
announcements the police were there to serve a 
search warrant, the occupants were under 
arrest, and they should come to the door and 
show themselves. There was no response and the 
front door was rammed. Inside the house police 
found two adult residents who were removed 
from the house at gunpoint with their 
nightclothes on.  They were arrested, 
handcuffed, searched, and handed over to 
investigators. The house was cleared, a 
marihuana grow operation was located, and the 
search warrant was left on the kitchen table.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the judge heard testimony that it was 
police policy to use ERT to serve warrants on 
residences where there was theft of hydro or 
marihuana grow operations. In the ERT leader’s 
opinion, ERT was best trained to address the 
unknown risks associated with grow operations 
where weapons or explosives could be present. 
As well, occupants could be violent and there 
could be electrical hazards present. On the 
other hand, the officer testified he did not know 
of any members being injured or attacked by 
weapons when executing these warrants. 
Furthermore, the officer said an operational plan 
is usually developed and the residence may have 
been checked for history, databases may have 
been searched for suspects, a drive by may have 
been done, floor plans may have been obtained, 
and surveillance for updated intelligence may 
have been conducted. The officer, however, did 
not know which checks were done or the results.  
 
The accused argued, in part, that their rights 
under ss.8 (search and seizure) and 9 (arbitrary 
detention) of the Charter were violated. It was 
suggested that the police entry and search of 
the residence was unreasonable and that the 
arrests were unlawful.  
 
Judge Bennett agreed with the accused and 
ruled the police violated their rights. First, the 
way the police conducted their entry was 
unreasonable under s.8 of the Charter. The 
court held: 
 
Crown counsel submitted that police officers 
took a very measured and slow approach to 
entering the residence.  They were in uniform 
and properly identified themselves.  In the 
circumstances, to police took reasonable steps 
to execute the warrant. 
 
I cannot accept those submissions.  The basis 
for the policy of using the ERT to serve 
warrants for hydro thefts and marijuana grow 
operations is based on risk of danger.  
However, that policy is not consistent with 
[the ERT leader’s] seven years experience on 
the ERT.  If there is a statistical basis for the 
policy, it was not be tendered into evidence. 
 
More specifically in this case, there is very 
little evidence of what actually was done to 
develop an operational plan.  It could easily be 
inferred that because the policy was in place, 
regardless of the circumstances, there was no 
actual need to develop a realistic operational 
plan. 
 
The question of whether the use of force to 
enter a residence was reasonable was 
addressed in Regina v. Vadon, [2000] B.C.J. No. 
2081 (B.C.S.C.).  In that case, the police had a 
search warrant for a suspected marijuana grow 
operation in a house.  The police officers used 
a battering ram on a door to gain entry to the 
house.   Several officers rushed into the house 
with their guns drawn.  They did this prior to 
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announcing that they were the police and had a 
search warrant.  Regarding the manner of 
entry, Williamson J. held: 
 
“Here, there is no evidence of a suggestion, 
let alone an explanation, of a violent response 
at this house.  Indeed, the evidence was that 
if the police had grounds to expect such a 
response, they would have utilized the 
services of the emergency response team.  
There is no evidence of any discussion by the 
police officers on this issue with respect to 
this residence.  Rather, the evidence 
indicates it was policy.  In other words, 
something along the lines of the carte 
blanche criticized by Chief Justice Dickson, 
a routine practice of effecting such entry 
without regard to the actual knowledge of 
the circumstances pertaining with respect to 
a particular incident.  
 
To attempt to justify the routine use of a 
battering ram to violate, unannounced, a 
private residence on the grounds that there 
have been weapons found in some homes 
where there have also been marijuana grow 
operations does not come close to meeting 
the onus upon the police to show why they 
concluded that such force and surprise were 
necessary in a particular entry.  It is clear 
from the comments in Genest that the Crown 
must lay an evidentiary framework to show 
that there were grounds to be concerned 
about the possibility of violence in this 
particular case.  No such evidence was led.” 
(paras 20 and 21). 
 
Although the…police did make the required 
announcements before ramming the door of the 
residence, the same legal principles apply.  If 
there were reasons for the use of the ERT at this 
particular residence, they are not in evidence.  The 
evidence of policy is not sufficient.   Therefore, I 
can only conclude that the manner of entry, in 
particular, was unreasonable.Enter [paras. 26-30] 
 
As for the lawfulness of the arrest, Judge Bullar 
Bennett concluded there were no reasonable 
grounds and the accused were therefore 
arbitrarily detained, stating: 
 
The police executing the search warrant did 
not have arrest warrants.  Their surveillance 
of the residence in the early morning 
immediately prior to their attendance at the 
residence did not show indications of any 
human life inside.  Their investigation and the 
early morning surveillance did not link either 
[accused] to the residence.   [The accused] 
were merely “found in” the residence.  They 
were arrested before the search commenced.  
Then, without questioning, they were taken to 
the police station and held there in cells for 
the better part of the day. [para. 34] 
 
And further: 
 
...  In the case before me, [the accused] were 
merely “found ins”.  There were no reasonable 
and probable grounds for believing that [they]  
were, had or were about to commit any crime.  
Therefore, the arrests were not made 
pursuant to Section 495(1) of the Code.  The 
arrests were arbitrary and unlawful.  I do 
conclude that both of the accused’s rights 
under Section 9 of the Charter were 
breached. [para. 37] 
 
The evidence, including the electrical diversion 
and marihuana plants, was excluded.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourts.bc.ca 
 
SEARCH MUST BE RELATED 
TO REASON FOR ARREST 
R. v. Mitchell, 2005 NBCA 104 
 
Police in New Brunswick were on 
the look out for the accused 
because they had information 
he would be travelling to their 
area to sell crack, he had an undertaking to 
remain in Nova Scotia, and he was under 
investigation for obstructing justice by falsely 
identifying himself. They saw his car and pulled 
it over. The accused was driving and was unable 
to provide a driver’s licence, registration, or 
insurance.  He again provided a false name and 
was arrested for obstruction of justice and 
breach of undertaking. He was frisk searched 
and police found $1,175 in cash but no drugs. He 
was advised of his right to counsel and wanted to 
speak to a lawyer.  
 
After informing the accused his uninsured 
vehicle would be towed to the police station, he 
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told officers there was $2,000 in the glove box. 
The police said they would inventory the 
contents of the car and it would be placed in a 
secure area. A further search revealed 24.6 
grms of crack cocaine hidden behind the gas cap 
cover. He was arrested for this offence, again 
advised of his rights, and subsequently charged 
with possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
At no time did the police inform the accused 
they suspected him of possessing cocaine or that 
they were going to search his car for such. 
 
The accused filed a motion in New Brunswick 
Provincial Court alleging his rights under s.8 of 
the Charter had been breached. The police 
testified that in their opinion the accused’s car 
contained cocaine but they did not want to 
arrest him because he then might be able to 
identify the informant. As well, police said a 
search warrant was not obtained because they 
were searching incidental to arrest. The grounds 
the police proffered were the informant 
information, the large amount of money in 
possession of the accused, and the money found 
in the glove box. The accused submitted that the 
search was not incidental to arrest and violated 
his right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure protected by s.8 of the 
Charter.  
 
The trial judge ruled there was no unreasonable 
search. As long as the police had reasonable 
grounds (subjective/objective test) to search 
the car, the common law allowed them to search 
as an incident to arrest. The evidence was 
admitted and the accused was convicted. 
 
The accused appealed the judge’s ruling to the 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal. Justice 
Robertson, authoring the Court’s unanimous 
judgment on the s.8 Charter issue, allowed the 
appeal, largely relying on the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision R. v. Caslake [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51. 
Although warrantless searches are prima facie 
unreasonable, a search incidental to arrest can 
be undertaken to secure the safety of the police 
and public, to protect evidence from being 
destroyed, and to discover evidence that can be 
used at trial. If the search is to find evidence 
related to the arrest, there must be a 
reasonable prospect of doing so. But this is not 
the same as having reasonable grounds to 
conduct the search. Rather, as Justice 
Robertson explained: 
 
…What is required is that the police have a 
reasonable basis for conducting the search, 
which is to be evaluated on both a subjective 
and objective level. The subjective element 
asks whether the police officer conducting the 
search was actually doing so for purposes 
related to the arrest. The objective 
component ensures that the police officer's 
belief that a valid purpose would be served by 
conducting the search was reasonable in the 
circumstances… [para. 13] 
 
In this case, the police arrested the accused for 
obstruction of justice and the search was not 
related to that reason. Justice Robertson held: 
 
Applying the law…to the facts of the present 
case, it is clear that the police did not search 
the [accused’s] car for purposes of finding 
evidence related to the reason for his arrest. 
The police were searching for illegal drugs. 
That objective is entirely unrelated to an 
arrest for obstruction of justice. On their own 
admission, the police were acting for reasons 
unrelated to the arrest. If follows that the 
search in question was not truly incidental to 
the arrest and, therefore, the [accused’s] 
right to be free of unreasonable searches, 
under s.8 of the Charter, was violated. 
[reference omitted, para. 19] 
 
Nor was the search justified as an inventory 
search: 
 
As the law presently stands, inventory 
searches are not authorized under the common 
law rule applicable to warrantless searches 
that are truly incidental to an arrest. At the 
same time, it has been held that if a vehicle is 
taken into custody pursuant to a regulatory 
duty the police may conduct an inventory 
search with respect to "visible property of 
apparent value"… In the present case, the 
Crown made no attempt to justify the 
 Volume 6 Issue 2             www.10-8.ca 
March/April 2006 
19
warrantless search of the [accused's] vehicle 
on the basis of an authorized inventory search. 
Even if the law recognized the validity of such 
searches, the search of the [accused’s] vehicle 
could not be justified as it went far beyond 
the itemizing of visible property of apparent 
value. The drugs were found concealed behind 
the gas cap. [reference omitted, para. 15] 
 
The court however was divided on the 
admissibility of the evidence. Justices Robertson 
and Deschenes were of the view the police were 
not acting in good faith and the evidence should 
be excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
 
…it must be determined whether the police 
acted in good faith. This is certainly not a case 
where we can hold that the search in question 
was the product of a reckless or deliberate 
disregard for the [accused’s] rights. At the 
same time, if there were any instance in which 
the plea of ignorance of the law should be 
rejected this is the one. The rule promulgated 
in R. v. Caslake is unambiguous: the reason for 
the incidental search must be related to the 
reason for which the accused was arrested. 
Chief Justice Lamer made this clear when he 
drew specific attention to the rule by 
underlining the relevant sentence… Prior to 
the release of R. v. Caslake, one could have 
argued that the issue was unsettled despite 
the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. 
Belnavis, as that decision is not binding in this 
Province. One could go so far as to argue that 
the subsequent endorsement of Belnavis in the 
majority opinion in R. v. Stillman was obiter and 
given the deep divisions within that Court the 
law on car searches incident to arrest 
remained clouded. However, once the Supreme 
Court released its decision in R. v. Caslake the 
police could no longer plead ignorance or 
reasonable error. To use the words of Justice 
Sopinka in R. v. Kokesch, either the police knew 
or ought to have known what the law with 
respect to a vehicle search that is incidental 
to an arrest. Clearly the police ought to have 
known. 
 
In the present case, one cannot even make a 
credible argument that the error in question 
arises from "an entirely reasonable 
misunderstanding of the law". This is because 
there is nothing to misunderstand. Moreover 
R. v. Caslake has been on the books since 
January of 1998. A period of nearly eight 
years has passed and yet the police's only 
explanation for their ignorance of the law is 
that they were ignorant. Should a plea of good 
faith be accepted in these circumstances? In 
my opinion, the answer to that question must 
be no… [paras. 31-32] 
 
Justice Richard, on the other hand, would have 
admitted the evidence. As a result of the 
majority’s decision, the drugs were excluded, 
the conviction set aside, and a not guilty verdict 
was entered.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD 
TEST ANSWERS 
 
1. (a) true—see R. v. LeClaire (at p. 4 of this 
publication). Justice Roscoe stated, “There is 
an implied licence for all members of the 
public, including the police, to approach a door 
of a residence and knock… If the police act in 
accordance with this invitation, there is no 
intrusion upon the privacy of the occupant.” 
 
2. (b) false—see R. v. Mitchell (at p. 17 of this 
publication). Justices Robertson (Deschenes 
concurring) stated, “The rule promulgated [for 
searches incidental to arrest by the Supreme 
Court of Canada] in R. v. Caslake is 
unambiguous: the reason for the incidental 
search must be related to the reason for 
which the accused was arrested.” In other 
words, the evidence the officer is searching 
for must be connected to why they made the 
arrest. For example, an arrest for break and 
enter would surely justify a search for 
evidence related to break and enter, such as 
stolen property or break-in tools. However, a 
search for drugs may be outside this ambit, 
unless of course, the break-in was related to 
drugs, such as a grow rip.  
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3. (a) false—see Patterson (at p. 8 of this 
publication). In this case the court concluded 
the officer’s safety concerns were of a 
general nature and not specific enough to 
justify suspending the arrestee’s right to 
counsel until the search began. This case, 
once again, reminds officers that there is no 
bright line rule in suspending an arrestee’s 
right to counsel.  What is reasonable in any 
given situation will turn on the unique facts of 
the case. 
 
4. (a) true—see Richardson v. Vancouver (at p. 10 
of this publication). Justice Donald stated, 
“The lawfulness of arrest must depend on the 
subjective belief of the arresting officer and 
an objective assessment of that belief based 
on what the officer knew at the material 
time.  It is a question related to the individual 
officer.  I know of no authority that supports 
the notion of a collective intelligence, the sum 
of knowledge possessed by all the police in an 
operation, as the basis for judging the 
lawfulness of arrest.” 
 
JUDGE NEED NOT CHECK 
COMMON SENSE AT DOOR 
R. v. Mowry, 2006 NBCA 18 
 
Acting on source information, 
the police attended a remote and 
uninhabited area of Crown land 
where they found a 175 
marihuana plant grow in a clearing. The officers 
left and returned a few months later. The plants 
had grown a few feet, were dry, and their leaves 
were yellow. The following day the police 
returned and conducted surveillance. The 
accused, and two others, arrived and were 
videotaped for about 12 minutes.  
 
In the video tape the accused could be seen 
moving around the plants and bending over at the 
waist, however his hands were not in view. The 
other two men were seen involved in activities 
such as pruning, carrying a water bucket, or 
holding a hose. At trial in New Brunswick 
Provincial Court the accused was convicted of 
marihuana production. “Produce” under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act includes 
obtaining a substance by cultivating, such as 
doing anything to help raise the plants, like the 
preparation and use of the soil, the removal of 
weeds from the vicinity of the plants, and 
pruning. An appeal to the New Brunswick Court 
of Queen’s Bench was dismissed.  
 
The accused appealed further to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing that the trial 
judge’s verdict was unreasonable since the video 
did not show what he was doing with his hands. 
He was not seen touching the plants or handling 
any watering equipment. Chief Justice Drapeau, 
writing the unanimous opinion, dismissed the 
appeal.  He stated: 
 
The trial judge was not required to check her 
common sense at the courtroom door. A 
contextual commonsensical appreciation of 
what [the accused] is shown doing on the 
videotape leads inescapably to the conclusion 
that he was engaged in cultivating the cannabis 
(marihuana) plants that are the subject of the 
underlying charge and the impugned conviction. 
It is obvious from the video that [the men] 
were operating as a team, each doing his part 
to help the plants’ growth. The trial judge 
properly assessed [the accused’s] actions in 
the context provided by the evidence as a 
whole, including the actions of his two 
plantation co-workers. [para. 14] 
 
The conviction was upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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